Shifting the balance of power: civil liberties in the 21st century by Bindman, Geoffrey
Shifting the balance of 
power: civil liberties in 
the 21st century
by Geoffrey Bindman
The title of this piece was chosen before 11 September. The events of 
that day and the so-called 'war against terrorism' present new 
challenges to those who value civil liberties and to the rule of law, and I 
will come to those later.
F irst, I need to say a little about my own standpoint. In 1963 I started one of the first legal aid solicitors' practices in North London. While I 
have dabbled in all kinds of legal problems, my main 
interest has always been to help people achieve justice in 
their relations with the rich and powerful, including the 
state and other public authorities. So civil liberties have 
been a vocation. By civil liberties I mean those freedoms, 
which in Britain over centuries have become recognised 
by the law as belonging to every individual. In this 
article I stick to civil and political rights, broadly those 
listed in the European Human Plights Convention (ECHR) 
and the Human Rights Act: the right to freedom from 
arbitrary arrest, detention, torture and inhuman and 
degrading treatment, the right of privacy and tree
speech, free thought and movement, the right to a fairr ' o ' o
trial and the freedom to assemble and protest. I do not 
deal with economic and social rights, or environmentalO
rights (the so-called third generation rights, important 
as they are) because I do not want to spend time on fine 
distinctions and drawing boundaries.
HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENTS
I stress the historical basis of civil liberties in Britain. 
Largely British Lawyers drafted the European Convention and 
it draws on English history. We must not throw away what 
has been achieved here by hard fought struggle overJ o oo
centuries. Let me begin with Magna Carta, the product in 
the year 1215 of one of the earliest protest movements. 
The barons who demanded concessions from King John 
were not representatives of the people but great 
landowners. Nevertheless part of their achievement was to 
establish minimum rights for the people against the 
otherwise absolute power of the state, personified in the 
king:
'No freeman shall be taken or imprisoned or disseised or 
exiled or in any way destroyed, nor will we go upon him nor 
will we send upon him except by the lawful judgement of his 
peers or the law of the land.'
Some see this as the origin of modern jury trial and 
indeed of the rule of law. G M Trevelyan says of it 'a 
process had begun which was to end in the putting the 
power of the Crown into the hands of the community at 
large.' The Great Charter had a profound influence on 
future generations. To quote Trevelyan again:
'The antiquarians and lawyers who asserted our 
Parliamentary liberties in the age of Coke and Selden saw 
looming through the mists of time the gigantic figure of 
Magna Carta as the goddess of English freedom... its historical 
importance lay not only in what the men of 1215 meant by 
its clauses, but in the effect it has had in the imagination of 
their descendants.'
The clause, which I have quoted, has a specific relevance 
to civil liberties. It asserted the right of the individual to 
freedom except where the law restricts it.
From this other principles follow. First, the 
presumption of innocence. The burden of proving 
wrongdoing or liability rests on the claimant, whether the 
state or a private individual. That is the basis of the writ of 
habeas corpus, by which the courts for centuries 
intervened to release anyone detained without lawful 
authority. In 1628 Selden described habeas corpus as 'the 
highest remedy in law for any man that is imprisoned' 
(Radzinowicz). The right against self-incrimination and 
the closely related right to remain silent in response to 
questioning by police or others in authority also follow.
The jury has had a vital role in safeguarding our civil 
liberties. In 1794 several leading radicals, who demanded
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reform of the electoral system in the wake of the French 
Revolution, were prosecuted for treason. The judge 
directed the jury in terms which required them to convict. 
The jury acquitted, as they had the right to do. In the 
1980s a jury similarly cleared Clive Ponting after the judge 
rejected his defence under the Official Secrets Act.
It came to be accepted that civil liberty was the normal 
right and entitlement of all citizens. It can fairly be claimed 
that the principles I have mentioned acquired 
constitutional status, limited only where there were 
powerful reasons of security, which the state had to justify. 
The cardinal principle was that everything was lawful 
unless the law prohibited it. Requiring the press in earlier 
times to be licensed restricted free speech. Laws of 
sedition and libel laws also imposed restrictions. 
Restrictions had been imposed on religious freedom. By 
fits and starts most of these restraints were removed.
Later in the 19th century, however, civil liberties were 
under threat in Ireland where there was unrest. Parliament 
passed Coercion Acts to permit executive detention. Dicey 
described one of these as:
'in principle ... thoroughly \icious; it in effect gave the Irish 
executive an unlimited power of arrest; it established in them 
a despotic government. It could not be made permanent, and 
applied to the whole United Kingdom without depriving every 
citizen of securityJor his personal freedom.'
In the 1914-18 war such powers were indeed extended 
to the whole United Kingdom. The Defence of the Realm Act 
allowed detention of those suspected of aiding the enemy. 
They became liable to arrest and unlimited detention on 
the authority of the Home Secretary. The powers taken in 
the First World War were removed thereafter, but they 
were relied on as a model \vhen war threatened again in 
the 1930s. An anxious government introduced similar 
measures, exemplified by the notorious regulation 18B. As 
Professor Brian Simpson has shown, this measure was 
initiated with no regard to civil liberty whatsoever. It was 
designed by the then officials of the Home Office to confer 
absolute power on the Secretary of State to detain without 
charge or trial anyone who in his opinion needed to be 
prevented from acting in any manner prejudicial to the 
public safety.
The first draft used this language. Professor Simpson says 
that 'this draft expressed the spirit of arrogant self- 
confidence, which as a consequence of the vast extension of 
bureaucratic power during the first war, had come to infect 
the higher Civil Service.' The Secretary of State was given 
power to detain where he had reasonable cause to believe a 
person to be of hostile origins or associations or to have 
been recently concerned in acts prejudicial to the public 
safety or the defence of the realm. The eventual scheme 
incorporated some safeguards. The reason for detention 
had to be set out in writing and the detainee was given the 
right to make representations to an advisory committee
which could supply further particulars of the reasons for 
detention and could recommend release. But the intention 
of those advising the government, as documented by Brian 
Simpson, was to exclude judicial review.
Jack Perlsweig was a Jew who had changed his name to 
Robert Liversidge. Doubtless he did so as many Jews at the 
time did in order to avoid anti-semitism. He had been a 
successful businessman and on the outbreak of war 
volunteered for the RAF where he became an officer. 
Apparently because he had applied in a name not his 
original one, and because he had some unsavoury
o ' J
acquaintances in his business life, he was detained under 
regulation 18 (b). It is absolutely plain now that he was not 
a threat to security in any way. Liversidge challenged his 
detention in the courts up to the House of Lords, who 
decided they were powerless to intervene. They held that 
the reasonableness of the Home Secretary's belief was a 
matter for him and not for the courts. Lord Atkin famously 
and eloquently dissented, accusing his colleagues of failing 
in their duty to protect the liberty of the citizen against the 
arbitrary action of government. I quote one well-known 
passage, which resonates today:
'In this country, among the clash of arms, the laws are not 
silent. They may be changed but they speak the same 
language in war as in peace. It has always been one of the 
pillars cffreedom, one of the principles of liberty for which on 
recent authority we are now fighting, that the judges are no 
respecters of persons and stand between the subject and any 
attempted encroachments on his liberty by the executive, alert 
to see that any coercive action is justified in law.'
Many people were detained under regulation 18(b) for 
no good reason and often in poor conditions. Abrogating 
traditional safeguards led to abuses and injustice and, 
according to Brian Simpson, with no effect whatsoever on 
the war. Hundreds suffered in vain. In 1944 Winston 
Churchill approved the release by Herbert Morrison of 
Oswald Mosley on health grounds. He cabled Morrison as 
follows:
'You might consider whether you should not unfold as a 
background the great privilege cf habeas corpus and trial by 
jury, which are the supreme protection invented by the 
English people for ordinary individuals against the state. The 
power of the executive to cast any man into prison without 
formulating any charge known to the law, and particularly to 
deny him the judgment of his peers, is in the highest degree 
odious and is the foundation of all totalitarian government... 
Nothing is more abhorrent than to imprison a person or keep 
him in prison because he is unpopular. This is really the test 
of civilisation.'
In more recent years Atkin's view has received greater
^ o
approval than the majority' view, at any rate outside Britain. 
A few brave South African judges during the apartheid 
regime struck down ministerial rulings made under similar 
regulations. However, in Britain the judges have continued
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to show reluctance to intervene. In 1977, Lord Denning 
said in the case of Hosenball:
'There is a conflict between the interests of national security 
on the one hand and the freedom of the individual on the 
other. The balance between these two is notjor a court of law. 
It is for the Home Secretary. He is the person entrusted by 
Parliament with the task. In some parts of the world national 
security has been used as an excuse Jor all sorts of 
infringements of individual liberty. But not in England.'
This is astonishingly complacent, but not untypical of 
the time.
CIVIL LIBERTIES IN THE TWENTIETH 
CENTURY
I have taken rather a long time to reach the present 
century. I believe the history which I have recounted is 
important because it demonstrates a long, proud 
certainly unique legal framework for guaranteeing the 
protection of civil liberties. There have been fluctuations 
in the effectiveness of that protection, but by and large it 
has helped to discourage arbitrary deprivation of liberty 
even in modern times. The independence of the judges 
and their capacity and willingness to maintain and apply 
these principles are vital issues. The problem is that they 
cannot easily be expected to defy Parliament even if they 
wish to.
Even before 11 September we had good reason to be 
concerned at the erosion and suppression of civil liberty by 
legislation. The world has become vastly more complex 
since Magna Carta. The volume of legislation and 
regulation, which impinges on civil liberties, is huge. Only 
in the 20th century for the first time was international 
agreement attempted on the identification and 
categorisation of fundamental rights and liberties.
The rights identified in 1950 in the ECHR became
o
accessible to residents of the United Kingdom at least after 
the right of individual petition was accepted in 1966. The 
possibility of challenging the failure of domestic law to 
protect those rights proved an inadequate safeguard both 
because the process in Strasbourg was cumbersome, slow 
and expensive and because the terms of the Convention did 
not cover important liberties. Indeed, restrictions on civil 
liberties continued to be imposed. During the Thatcher 
period numerous inroads were made. Keith Ewing and 
Conor Gearty filled a whole book with examples (Freedom 
under Thatcher). To note a few at this stage:
• police powers were extended by the Police and Criminal 
Evidence Act 1984, widening powers of arrest without 
warrant: the right of an arrestee to legal advice was
' o o
restricted by requiring the arrestee to establish a request 
for it;
* restrictions were made on freedom of assembly and 
protest, especially in relation to industrial disputes;
• tougher powers were implemented to suppress 
information on national security grounds bv restrictingj o j o
the public interest defence.
In this last example I refer to the case of Clive Ponting, 
who disclosed information about the sinking of the 
Argentinian battleship Belgrano during the Falklands war 
to a Member of Parliament. The judge directed the jury 
that 'the policies of the state mean the policies laid down 
by the recognised organs of government and authority'. 
After the jury flouted that direction by acquitting Ponting, 
the new Ojficial Secrets Act passed in 1989 made the defence 
even more restrictive. The issue is very much a live one, 
which the House of Lords will have a chance to review in 
the forthcoming Shayler appeal.
Under the present government we have seen little 
inclination to reverse the restrictions of the Thatcher 
period. On the contrary, since it took office in 1997 we 
have seen further restrictions. We have also seen access to 
legal advice and representation made more difficult by the 
changes which have been made to legal aid. That is a big 
subject, which I cannot examine in detail here.
GOVERNMENT RESTRICTIONS ON CIVIL 
LIBERTIES
Governments can always justify restrictions on civil 
liberties by the need for tough measures to stamp out or 
prevent crime, even though there is no evidence that any 
measure proposed will promote either of these objectives. 
Certainly there is no basis for believing that the denial of 
basic rights will significantly reduce crime, and if it does so 
it must be at the expense of the liberty of innocent people. 
I will not list all the acts or omissions of the present 
government which merit criticism, but it is worth 
mentioning some which were expressly criticised by the 
UN Human Rights Commission at the end of last year:
• The detention without charge or trial oi asylum 
seekers. Here I would mention the successful 
challenge last year by some of those detained at 
Oakington, who complained that their detention 
violated Article 5 of the ECHR. The judgment of 
Collins J in my opinion was entirely logical and sound 
but the Court of Appeal reversed his decision, 
apparently holding that the convenience of the Home 
Office could justify deprivation of the liberty of 
innocent people.
• The government's failure to tackle racial incitement. 
This is a criticism of the failure of the government to 
protect the liberty of those subjected to racial 
harassment.
• Use of the Ojficial Secrets Act to prevent journalists and 
former employees from speaking out on issues of public 
concern.
• Failure to set up an inquiry into state-sponsored
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murders in Northern Ireland (this refers particularly to 
the Finucane and Nelson cases).
• Deficiencies in anti-discrimination law.
• Failure to reconsider the removal of the right to silenceo
by allowing adverse inferences to be drawn from a 
defendant's silence.
• Withholding of evidence in criminal cases by relying ono J J o
Public Interest Immunity.
Other examples not raised by the UN Human Rights
1 J O
Committee include the powers of surveillance by police 
granted by the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, the 
Terrorism Act, and the Anti-Terrorism Crime and Security Act 
2001. I will deal with those below.
THREE AREAS OF GREATEST HOPE
This bleak picture is lightened to some degree by some 
measures, which have extended rights. For example, anti­ 
discrimination law has been strengthened following the 
Stephen Lawrence Inquiry. The greatest hope for civil 
liberties is in three areas which I will now look at: the 
Human Rights Act; European Community Law; and 
International Human Rights law.o
Because the Human Rights Act allows the civil liberties 
safeguards embodied in the Convention to be directly 
invoked in domestic courts, they are much more accessible 
and are already having a positive impact. However, that 
impact has been much more modest than was predicted by 
those who saw the HRA as a charter for troublemakers 
who would flood the courts with frivolous complaints. The 
Human Rights Project at LSE has tracked all the cases in 
the higher courts in which the Act has been relied on. In 
its recent report, covering cases up to the end of 
December 2001, it says:
'. ..it appears that the Act has been successfully pleaded much 
less often than was anticipated in the months before its 
coming into effect. Human rights points have almost always 
been raised in cases, which would have been taken anyway, 
using traditional legal grounds of challenge. In other cases, 
judges have found human right principles to reinforce the 
result reached, rather than radically alter it. There has 
therefore been less the forecasted legal revolution, and more 
the first steps in a process of subtly weaving human rights 
principles into the fabric of existing UK law.'
Coming down to figures, we are talking about 347 cases 
in all, out of which the outcome, reasoning, or procedure 
was affected in 247 cases. In only three cases was the 
domestic law declared incompatible with the rights 
protected by the HRA. Only 72 claims brought directly 
under the Human Rights Act succeeded.
One can interpret these results in different ways. A 
reassuring conclusion would be that our law protects civil 
liberties rather well, and only a few loopholes need filling. 
One must also remember that the Act appears to have been
taken very seriously by many public authorities that have 
altered previously doubtful practices in order to comply 
with it. However, it is not obvious that the public at large 
is aware of its rights under the Act or knows how to lodge 
a complaint. The government has resisted calls for a 
Human Rights Commission which could educate ando
advise the public and could help to filter and target issues 
which ought to be decided in the public interest. The 
United Nations Human Rights Committee at the end ofo
last year criticised the UK government for failing to set up 
such a Commission. The claim by the Human Rights 
Project that most of the cases raising human rights issues 
would have been brought anyway highlights concern that 
there may be obstacles to raising novel questions.
An obvious difficulty is funding. The ability of those 
without substantial means suffers from the changes in legal 
aid, which I have mentioned. Also, it appears that the
priority funding for human rights cases, which, wasr j o o 7 7
announced by the Lord Chancellor after the Act became 
law has rarely, if ever, been called upon.
Other shortcomings, which limit the effectiveness of the 
Human Rights Act as a safeguard for civil liberties, are to be 
found in the Convention itself. Although it originated in
o o
the English civil liberties tradition described earlier, it haso
important gaps. For example, the right to a fair trial does 
not include the right to trial by jury - doubtless because 
juries are not used in continental legal systems. 
Furthermore, it fails to reflect human rights issues that
' O
have become major concerns since 1950. Social and 
political rights are completely absent, including 
employment rights. Discrimination is prohibited only 
when incidental to other rights. There are also signs of 
growing unwillingness of the Court ot Human Rights to 
interfere with what is perceived as acceptable to 
governments in general. In the recent case of Al-Adsani the
o o
court, admittedly by the narrowest possible majority, 
rejected a claim under Article 6 that state immunity was 
incompatible with the right to a fair trial, even where the 
claimant alleged torture. The doctrine of 'margin of 
appreciation' allows the court to abstain from politically 
sensitive issues.
A right to be free from discrimination on racial and other
o
grounds will be added to the Convention by the 12th 
protocol, now in draft. Meanwhile, some protection against 
gender discrimination is provided by European Community 
law, which, unlike the ECHR has long been directly 
enforceable within domestic courts. Cases taken to the 
European Court of Justice have strengthened anti­ 
discrimination law by, for example, removing the limit on the 
level of compensation, which can be awarded in 
discrimination cases, and by ending sexual orientation 
discrimination in the armed forces. As a result of Article 13 
of the Treaty of Amsterdam, the legislative powers of the 
European Commission are extended to other forms of 
discrimination and a Directive prohibiting employment and
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other discrimination will soon be in force. Time does not 
allow a fuller exploration of the complexities of European 
law on discrimination. Suffice it to say that in the next few 
years it will extend protection from discrimination beyond 
the current domestic categories of race, gender and disability.
o ' o J
European community law also has an impact on civil 
liberties in other areas, particularly immigration and 
asylum, and in the extension of police powers across 
national boundaries. In these areas the effect has not 
been to extend but to weaken protection of civil 
liberties. The excellent magazine Statewatch, which 
describes its objective as 'monitoring the state and civil 
liberties in the UK and Europe', has documented for 
some years the proliferation of legislation in the 
European Union and its Member States designed to 
promote co-operation between police and other 
authorities in criminal investigation and immigration 
control. That co-operation includes the exchange of 
information and sharing the results of surveillance. 
Statewatch has constantly warned against the lack of 
access to information about these arrangements and the 
absence of democratic control within the European 
institutions. Recent proposals for simplifying extradition 
between European states and for a European arrest 
warrant which will enable suspects to be transported 
across national borders pose great dangers. Inevitably 
they weaken the capacity of those deprived of liberty to 
mount any effective challenge.
There have been some positive developments in 
international human rights law, which increase the 
prospects for bringing to justice those in positions of 
power who abuse human rights and who commit crimes 
against humanity. The forthcoming establishment of the 
International Criminal Court and the trend towards 
universal jurisdiction over crimes against humanity may 
prove to be an effective vehicle for the prosecution of those 
major international criminals who at present can travel 
about the world without fear of retribution. We have also 
seen in operation the war crimes tribunals for Rwanda and 
the former Yugoslavia. Though slow and under-resourced, 
they have been the means of bringing to trial major 
criminals who would not have faced justice in their own 
countries.
ISSUE OF TERRORISM
Now at last I come to the issue of terrorism, not 
unknown before 11 September. The threats by 
government to civil liberties which I have referred to so far 
have all been in train before 11 September, but the so- 
called 'war against terrorism' is being used, and will 
continue to be used, to justify repressive and coercive 
measures which even before that momentous date mighto
have seemed unacceptable.
The Terrorism Act 2000 came into force on 10 February 
2001. It was partly designed to consolidate existing
legislation, including the Prevention of Terrorism Act. The 
latter was temporary and renewable, and was limited to 
terrorism in Northern Ireland. The new Act widened the 
definition of terrorism and authorised the Home Secretary
to proscribe organisations believed by him to engage in orr o j o o
advocate terrorism and made it a criminal offence to be a 
member of such an organisation or to support it without 
being a member. The funds of such organisations were 
liable to be frozen or forfeited. Participation in a meeting 
of three or more people to support or further the activities 
of such an organisation became a criminal offence. An
o
appeal against proscription can be made to a Prescribed 
Organisations Appeal Commission, and judicial review 
may be available, but it remains uncertain that a court 
could ever investigate the facts on which the Homeo
Secretary bases his decision to proscribe and quash it 
(shades of Liversidge and Anderson). I was asked to advise 
a proscribed organisation and we consulted counsel. We 
realised at our consultation -at which five people were 
present - that we were unwittingly committing an offence. 
We wrote to the Attorney General to ask him not to 
prosecute us. He kindly said he would not do so.
No one denies the seriousness of the threat of terrorist 
violence and stern measures are justified to deter and 
indeed punish those guilty of terrorist offences. But is it 
really necessary to violate fundamental liberties to do so? 
History may not be a totally reliable guide because 
technological sophistication poses unprecedented 
challenges. But reliance on the unsupported opinion of 
police and security personnel has failed us many times - I 
have already talked about regulation 18B in the Second 
World War - and produced many miscarriages of justice.
The saddest blow to civil liberties in Britain has been 
the government's derogation from Article 5 of the
o o
European Human Rights Convention and from the equivalent 
provision in the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights to validate detention without charge or trial of 
suspected international terrorists under section 2 3 of the 
Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001. The detention 
can last as long as such a person cannot be deported or 
removed to another country, in other words for life. To 
detain an innocent person indefinitely on the basis of 
mere suspicion cannot be justified. The possibility of 
challenge under the Human Rights Act remains of course
o o
both as to the validity of the law and in any individual case 
which might arise, but in the current atmosphere one 
cannot be optimistic that any such claim would succeed. 
Nor do the 'sunset clauses' in the Act give much comfort. 
History tells us that restrictions on liberty once enacted 
usually remain.
Under the present government police powers have been 
extended in many ways. There has been a plethora of 
complex legislation since 1997 adding to the powers of 
government to invade the privacy of the citizen. Among 
such legislation is the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act
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2000, (which coincidentally came into force on the same 
day as the Human Rights Act), the Terrorism Act 2000 which 
I have referred to, the Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001, 
and the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001. Trial by 
jury has been threatened and, following the Auld report, is 
still under threat.
PROSPECTS FOR CIVIL LIBERTIES
So, to conclude, what are the prospects for civil liberties 
in the present century? On the positive side there are the 
ECHR and the Human Rights Act. The Act will be provide 
continuing opportunities for challenging the attacks on 
civil liberties but the deficiencies I have described are likely 
to remain and there seems no early prospect of a distinct 
British Bill of Rights which may be the only way of 
modernising human rights safeguards.
On the negative side is the insecurity of governments,
o J o '
which encourages them to secretive, heavy-handed and 
repressive use of their power. That insecurity is naturally 
intensified by the events of 11 September and the 
widespread belief in a worldwide terrorist network capable 
of unpredictable and devastating violence. In the face of 
such fear, faith in civil liberties is weakened among many 
and to defend them becomes more difficult and more 
unpopular. We are seeing a distressing illustration in the 
USA, where civil liberties have the most powerful legal
safeguards. There is mass support there for attempts by the 
government to circumvent those safeguards by taking 
prisoners outside the jurisdiction, where they are held 
without charge or trial, or access to lawyers, and in 
defiance of the Geneva Conventions. In Britain we have 
not yet gone down the same road.
In between the state and the individual the judges have 
a difficult role. Many deserve credit for their fearlessly 
principled willingness to stand up to government where 
civil liberties are in jeopardy. There is respectable support 
for the view that the judges' constitutional role as the 
protectors of fundamental rights transcend parliamentary 
sovereignty. I refer to the remarks of Lord Justice Laws in 
the case of Witham, which he has elaborated in lectures. 
But a battle between the judiciary and Parliament seems 
unlikely. In the last resort only the people themselves can 
defend their liberties. Whether they will succeed in doing 
so remains to be seen. In short, to conclude with a well- 
worn expression, which, I hope will never become 
obsolete, the jury is still out.
Geoffrey Bindman
Bindman S^Partners
This article is based on a leture given at the IALS on 21 
February 2002. @
The Law Society and the Bar: 
can they be trade unions, 
brand managers and public 
watchdogs at the same time?
by David Lock
The author reflects on the way lawyers are regulated and considers whether, in the 
long run, it is in the public interest for the present system of regulation by 
professional bodies to be continued in its present form.
T he question as to whether professionals can be trusted to regulate themselves in the public interest has come into sharp focus with the 
collapse of Enron and the allegations — to date 
unproved — of collusion by the auditors, Arthur 
Andersen. Hundreds of millions of dollars have been
spent in the US lobbying the senate over decades to 
preserve the right of self-regulation for accountants, 
only to find that the unwise and unauthorised shredding 
of documents by Andersen's appears to have 
fundamentally undermined public confidence in the 
concept of self-regulation.
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